Nick Hughes

Nick Hughes

Non-Stipendiary Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy
Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE)
Computer Science and Philosophy
Mathematics and Philosophy
Modern Languages and Philosophy
Psychology and Philosophy
Experimental Psychology

I grew up in Sussex, before moving to London to study for a BA and MA in Philosophy at UCL. I completed my PhD at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St Andrews and the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature at the University of Oslo. Prior to coming to New College, I held positions at University College Dublin and Durham University. 

Research Interests

My research interests lie primarily within normative epistemology and normative ethics, but extend to issues in philosophical methodology, the psychology of decision making, and the theory of rationality. Most of my work to date has focused on the limits of normative guidance, 'ought-implies-can' principles, questions about what normative and metaphysical roles knowledge plays, and the relationship between knowledge and rationality. I'm currently working on a project about the possibility, nature, and scope, of epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting, and so jointly unsatisfiable, epistemic requirements. 

Selected Publications

  • Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy. Forthcoming in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
  • Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance, and The Principle 'Ought-Implies-Can'. Forthcoming in Utilitas
  • Dilemmic Epistemology. Forthcoming in Synthese
  • Knowledgeable Assertion in the Image of Knowledgeable Belief. Forthcoming in Inquiry
  • Uniqueness, Rationality, and The Norm of Belief. Erkenntnis Vol. 84 (1) pp. 57-75 (2019)
  • Guidance, Obligations, and Ability: A Close Look at The Action Guidance Argument for Ought-Implies-Can. Itilitas. Vol. 30 (1) pp. 73-85 (2018)
  • No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. Vol 6 (3) pp. 157-166 (2017)
  • Do We Matter? Aeon Magazine, June 2017
  • Consistency and Evidence. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 169 (2) pp. 333-338 (2014)
  • Is Knowledge the Ability to Φ For the Reason That p? Episteme, Vol. 11 (4) pp. 457-462 (2014)
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